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Abstract
During the last decade the decrease in the size of
computing machinery, coupled with the increase in
their computing power have lend to the development
of the concept of mobile computing. Effects of this
new vision can be seen currently in the flourishing
numbers of mobile telephones and portable computing units. In the current work we investigate
some issues concerning the security of databases
and database systems in the mobile computing environment. We present a scheme for end-to-end
secure data transfer between one mobile computing
element to another based on a recent protocol for
key distribution. Secure data transfer is crucial
as a foundation to providing other more complex
interactions between the various mobile computing
elements. Following this we also present an extension to the scheme, applicable for the storage
of data in a mobile database, allowing for remote
accessibility of the data in a secure manner.

1

Introduction

The field of computing has entered a new era with
the birth of a new area of interest referred to loosely
as "mobile computing." The concept of mobile
computing developed from the realization that as
computing machinery decrease in size and increase
in computing power users will demand these machinery to be part of their everyday life, accompanying them in the carrying-out of their everyday
tasks. Researchers in this new field envisage that
mobile computing units, such as today's laptops
and palmtops, in the future will be communicating
with each other, whilst providing location transparency to the user. This notion of transparency is
carried-over from that in distributed computing, in
which the user is unaware of the remote physical
location of the resources being used by the distributed computing system. In the case of mobile
1 The author is also at the Department of Computing
& Information Systems, University of Western Sydney Macarthur, Campbelltown, NSW 2560, Australia

computing, however, several differences emerge. The
major difference - and in contrast to distributed
computing - is precisely the mobility or the nonfixed positioning of some of the computing elements.
This difference in itself presen ts various new challenges to researchers in the field. These challenges
lie not only in the underlying area of mobile communications, but also in the the area of computing
strategies and algorithms for non-fixed computing
units.
In this work we discuss some issues concerning the security of databases and database systems in the mobile computing environment. In
the same way that distributed databases presented
challenges to the broader area of distributed computing, mobile database poses some new and particular problems in the wider concept of mobile
computing. We recognize that security must be
integrated into the design of new solutions to mobile computing. The second aim of this paper is to
present a scheme for secure data transfer between
one mobile computing element to another. This
ability is crucial as a foundation to providing other
more complex interactions between the various mobile computing elements. Following this we also
present an extension to the scheme, applicable for
the storage of data in a mobile database, allowing for remote accessibility of the data in a secure
manner.
In the next section we briefly discuss the background and motivations of the current work. This
is followed by a general discussion on some security issues in mobile computing, focusing on mobile databases. Section 4 discusses a scheme that
provides secure end-to-end data transfer between
mobile computing elements. Section 5 applies the
scheme to the storage of data in a mobile database,
concentrating on the accessibility of the stored date
by remote users. Finally, Section 6 closes the paper
with some remarks and conclusion.

2

Background and Motivation

(eg. corporate sales data) and may connect to
remote fixed hosts, the safe and secure storage of
In order to realize the revolutionary concept of mothe cryptographic parameters that provide access
bile computing, a wireless network architecture is
to the data is of paramount importance.
required that will support the mobile computing
The later of the two related problem can be
environment in the near and distant future, and
solved using current technology in the form of smartthat will accommodate further technological develcards. Increasingly, smartcards are used for user
opments in the area. Such a basic network archiauthentication is various non-mobile environments
tecture has been suggested in [1] (Figure 1). Three
and and are recognized to be a suitable medium for
of its main components are the Mobile Units (MU),
the storage of a limited amount of cryptographic
which are the users and their portable computing
parameters [4, 5].
units; the Mobile Support Stations (MSS) which
In this paper we turn to the ILM protocol [6, 7]
are the stations which maintain communications
in the hope of providing a solution for the first of
with the mobile units; the Fixed Host which are
the two problems. The protocol provides a method
the other nodes connected to the mobile support
for two parties to commence communications withstations.
out previously communicating with each other. The
A further component is the Location Servers
protocol does away with the need of exchanging
(LS) which are employed to maintain data on the cryptographic parameters before the parties composition and actions of each mobile unit. Hence,
municate. The problem of the achieving a common
a given location server holds a database containcryptographic parameter (eg. session key) is shifted
ing information about a mobile unit registered as
into that of creating suitable and matching paramhaving a "home-base" in the area or zone managed
eters which are stored in the users' smartcards, as
by the location server and data on those "visitors"
will be discussed in Section 4.
in the area (cell). These location server databases
In the following section we continue to discuss
are used to manage and operate the mobile wireother security issues within mobile computing, and
less network [2], and as such, they are not directly
in particular in mobile database systems. The aim
accessible to the mobile units. The data stored in
of the discussion is illustrate different problems which
these database are used and inter-exchanged only were previously unforeseen, and identify those which
among location servers, and between location servers are immediately relevant in the near future.
and mobile support stations. The location servers
typically correspond to mobile switching offices, with 3
Mobile Databases: Some Security
approximately 60 to 100 mobile support stations
Issues
being catered for by one location server [3] In the
current paper we assume that each mobile unit The nomadic nature of some mobile computing elincorporates a multiuser database system which is ements have introduced new problems which were
accessible by the owner of the mobile unit and by non-existent in the traditional areas of computing.
New solutions and solutions derived from tradithe other (mobile) users from remote sites.
tional computing are in demand in order to transFrom the point of security, one immediate problem becom~s evident in mobile and nomadic com- form the dreams of mobile computing into a reality.
In the notable work of [8], four categories for
puting environment, namely the issue of global user
identification and authentication. This issue is fur- future developments in mobile wireless computing
ther complicated by the fact that mobile units have have been proposed, namely mobility, disconnection, data access modes and scale of operation. These
limited resources which must be used sparingly.
Hence, overheads due to security which were tol- areas present challenges to the traditional approach
erable in traditional fixed distributed systems are to data management and database systems, which
here required to be minimized or eliminated. With until recently have not included effects of mobility
respect to security, one of the major sources of over- into their design and applications. In this paper
heads is the security (cryptographic) parameters we would like to propose security as being the fifth
that need to be exchanged between communicating category which intersects the first four categories.
parties before any interactions commence. This re- In the following, we briefly discuss some security
quirement of exchanging parameters is also present issues within the framework of two of the areas
in mobile computing systems and is of major con- specified by [8].
cern for researchers who are developing new crypto3.1 Mobility and Security
graphic algorithms for mobile computing systems.
Coupled with the problem of communications The fact that both users and the data that they
overheads is the problem of the management of carry have become a mobile component in computcryptographic parameters, particularly in the mo- ing has in itself introduced a different set of security
bile unit carried by the user. Bearing in mind problems. In the traditional case of fixed (nonthat mobile units may often carry sensitive data mobile) computing physical protection could easily
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Figure 1: The Mobile Computing Network (after [1])
be afforded by making a computer and database
system physically isolated from the other components in the environment. In such a configuration
it was possible to make the system self-sufficient,
without any need to communicate with the external
world.
In mobile computing this form of isolation and
self-sufficiency is difficult to achieve due the relatively limited resources available to a mobile unit,
thereby necessitating it to communicate with the
mobile support station. The mobility of users and
the data that they carry introduces security problems from the point of view of the existence and
location of a user (which is deemed to be data in
themselves) and the secrecy and authenticity of the
data exchanged between users and between a user
and a fixed host.
More specifically, a user on a mobile wireless
network may choose to have the information concerning his or her existence treated as being confidential. That is, a user may choose to remain
anonymous to the majority of other users on the
network, with the exception of a select number
with whom the user often interacts. This problem
of user anonymity is related to a more difficult
problem of the. trust level afforded by each node
in the network and the problem of the security of
location data concerning a user when the location
data is stored or transferred between nodes as the
user moves in a nomadic fashion. These nodes must
provide some assurance to the user about his or her
anonymity, independent of the differing levels of
trust that may exist for each node. This requirement is of particular importance in the case of a
user that crosses between two zones which are under two nodes respectively, each having a different

trust level. Equally important is the secure transfer
of data between databases at nodes which hold
location data and other information or parameters
in the user profile. Here all traffic internal to the
network and transparent to the nomadic user must
be maintained secure and authentic.
Other problems include the possible inference
attacks on the databases and the provision of performance transparency [3] for the nomadic user.
Thus, as the user roams across zones, the user must
not experience a degradation in the access and latency times. Again, security must be considered
in the context of replication, both from the trust
level of the mobile support stations and fixed hosts
and from the point of view of data leakage. In
general, as sensitive data is replicated across several
sites, the security risks are also increased due to the
multiplication of the points of attack [9].

3.2

Disconnections and Security

Another major issue in mobile computing which
arises from mobility and power (battery) restrictions is disconnection. Disconnection of a mobile
unit from a mobile support station is necessary for
the conservation of power of the mobile unit. A
mobile unit can typically find itself running on a
temporary form of power supply (eg. spare battery) while its main power source is being recovered
(ie. recharged). In this situation differing levels
of disconnection may be introduced, ranging from
the normal connection to connections using low
bandwidth channels.
A crucial aspect of disconnection is the elective or non-elective nature of a disconnection [8].
The non-elective disconnection refers to the cases

when a mobile unit disconnects due to an unforeseen event, such as system crashes or total communications break-down when moving into certain geographic regions. The elective disconnection refers
to the planned and desired disconnection on the
part of the owner of the mobile unit who wishes
to temporarily limit remote access to his or her
mobile unit. This type of disconnection typically
covers instances where power availability is degrading, where the owner wishes to employ the maximum resources (eg. CPU) available for a short
task, or where the owner simply desires the mobile
unit to be put into a "sleep" state. In both types of
disconnections, a number of potential security loopholes may be introduced. The transition from one
level of disconnection to another may present an
opportunity for an attacker to masquerade either
the mobile unit or the mobile support station.

will be the foundation upon which other more complex interact~ons will be based.

4

Secure Data Transfers

End-to-end security and authenticity between components within a mobile computing systems represents an important foundation upon which other
operations must be based. The scheme presented
in the following is based on the Improved LeightonMicali (ILM) protocol [6], which establishes a secure end-to-end channel for data transfer 2.
Following the requirements of [6, 7], we assume
that tamper-proof VLSI chips are readily available.
These are incorporated into the computing equipment that handle secure data transfer, such as the
Mobile Units (MU), the Mobile Support Stations
(MSS) and the Fixed Hosts (FH) that hold cryptographic information. For simplicity, in the folOne possible solution to this problem is for the
lowing discussions we will only refer to the MUs
mobile unit and the mobile support station to agree
and the MSSs, although the intent is clear that
upon a secret before any transition in the levels of
other entities in the network that require secure
elective disconnections. When at a later time the
data transfer must have tamper-proof chips (eg.
mobile unit wishes to upgrade the connection level
memory). Furthermore, we will employ the terms
with the mobile support station, both parties can
"user" and "mobile unit" interchangeably, denoting
start by exchanging the shared secret in a secure
the computing element that is actually mobile or
manner. A good candidate for a solution to this
non-fixed. We assume that a publicly known oneproblem is zero-knowledge protocols, in which the
way hash function h exists (which may also be
mobile unit and the mobile support station can conreplaced with a cryptographically strong pseudovince each other that they hold the shared secret
random function). All data transfer instances are
without having to transmit the full secret [10].
assumed to be protected against the replay attacks
Another potential security problem related to through the use of timestamps, nonces or other
disconnections is the leaking of information [11, suitable mechanisms.
12] through the use of inappropriate concurrency
In the initialization stage, each user owning a
control techniques in the database of the mobile mobile unit will be assigned cryptographic paramunit. Related to this issue is the problem of in- eters by the Trusted Authority in the network. This
complete transactions caused by elective and non- is achieved through the use of smartcards issued to
elective disconnections. A number of scenarios present each user and to the administrator at each MSS.
themselves in this context. Security and integrity The parameters are not accessible to the users or
problems may occur in the case when hand-offs the administrators, and are used to generate a sesoccur between two mobile support stations as the sion key for secret and authentic data transfer. Bemobile unit crosses zones (cells). Other security fore using the MU a user (administrator) must inproblem may occur when a mobile unit deposits a sert his or her smartcard into the tamper-proof
"timed" transaction at a fixed-node, which begins compartment of each MU (MSS) in order for the
to execute when certain conditions are met (eg. - parameters to be loaded into the secure memory of
time of day, availability of raw data) and which the MU (MSS) [4].
transmits the results back to the nomadic mobile
unit. These scenarios represent only a few poten4.1 RegIstration
tial security problems among many others in the
In the ILM protocol it is assumed that the Trusted
context of levels of disconnections and transaction
Au thori ty holds M secret keys (Xl, ... , X M ). Each
management in mobile databases.
secret key is chosen uniformly at random by the
There is considerable research work to be done Trusted Authority and is of length k-bits. For
in the area of mobile computing systems, and in each user i who is enrolled into the system, the
particular, in the area of secure mobile databases.
Trusted Authority assigns an identity Ii and selects
As the area of research matures, more will be un2The original Leighton-Micali protocol of [6] had an
derstood concerning the security of data in mobile
inherent flaw which in our context allowed an attacker
computing and in the mobile wireless network. In to compromise data when it is in transit. This flaw has
the next section we will discuss the issue of how to subsequently been solved and the protocol improved by the
provide a secure channel for data exchange, which work in [7].

M random integers (01, ... , OM) from the interval
[1, LJ, where L is an integer.
The Trusted Authority then employs h to compute Y171
ham(Xm ) for all m
1, ... , M, where
hS (X) indicates applying consecutively the function h on an input X for s times. That is,

=

=

times
.-------...
hS(X) = he·· h(h( X»·· .).
s

Here (01, ... , OM) becomes the public key of user i.
The corresponding secret key (Y1 , ... , YM) is then
placed by the Trusted Authority into the tamperproof chip of the user's smartcard. The Trusted
Authority also injects a secret database key Di into
the chip (its use will be evident in the following
sections). The smartcard is only delivered to the
user after the secret key has been inserted, and
hence no person has access to the secret keys or the
other secret parameters within that user's tamperproof chip.

4.2

Secure Channels

When a user i at a mobile unit (MU) desires to
exchange data with another user j, such as for the
purpose of retrieving data, the calling user i must
first establish a secure channel with the controlling
MSS, and then request the MSS to further create a
secure channel with the destination MU of user j.
In the following we will apply the ILM protocol to establish a session key between user i and
the MSS without them previously communicating.
This session key will be denoted as Si,mss. The
aim of the scheme is for user i and the MSS to
arrive independently at keys Ki,mss and Kmss,i,
where Ki,rnss = Km .. ,i. The scheme is described
as follows [7], employing Ii as the identity of user i
and Imss as the identity of the MSS.

Note that the tamper-proof chip can easily compute hOm(Xm ) = hI5m-aml(Ym) (m = 1, ... , M)
and thus Ki,mu because it has available the values
Ym = ham(Xm ) residing in its internal memory.
The tamper-proof chip of the MSS then performs
symmetric procedures, obtaining the key Kmss i,
which is in fact identical to Ki,mss [7].
'
In order to aid our subsequent discussions we
will simplify Equation (1) into

Ii :::; I mss ,
Ii> 1m ...

(2)

As before, the k-bit value X is chosen randomly
by the Trusted Authority where k should be sufficiently large, say k ~ 100, in order to prevent it
from an exhaustive search attack [7]. The value X
is kept secret by the Trusted Authority, and during
the enrollment of users the Trusted Authority also
injects a copy of X into the chip of the smartcard
belonging to the user and into that belonging to the
administrator at each MSS and Fixed Host. Hence,
in fact, the value X is common to all parties in the
system.

4.3

Session Keys

After the user i and the MSS have established a
secure channel via keys Ki,m .. = Km .. ,i, the MSS
proceeds to establish another secure channel with
the MU of the destination user j using the previous
method. Here, the secure channel between the MSS
and user j will be via keys K171H,j = Kj,171u
At this point two general options are available
for the selection of the session keys. First, the MSS
can be given the authority to generate two session
keys, namely key Si,rn .. to be shared between user i
and the MSS, and key Sm .. ,j to be shared between
the MSS and user j. Alternatively, each of the users
can choose randomly and uniformly a key that they
1. The MU of user i must obtain the public key
will share with the MSS.
The first option, where the MSS has the au(f31, ... , f3M) of the MSS. This public key can
be resident in a list within each MU or it can thority to choose randomly and uniformly the keys
be read from a publicly readable file at one of Sj,mss and Smu,j, is advantageous from the point
of view of resource consumption at the MUs of
the MSSs.
both users. However, the second option can remain
2 . After
user
i
inserts
his
or
her
smart
card
into
.
.
attractive if some part of the computation could
hIS or her MU, the MU must prOVIde the smart- be performed off-line with the MU carrying the
card wit~ th~ p~blic key of the MSS. The ~amper- partly completed result of the computation. Other
proof chIp wlthm the smartcard of user ~ then methods such as real-time off-loading to a remote
computes the common key Ki,m .. as:
computation server can also be employed.
Assuming the first option is adopted, two approaches are available, namely for the MSS to choose
two distinct keys Si,rn .. and Sm .. ,j, or for the MSS
to select one key which it will share with both
5M
users (ie. S;,m ..
Sm .. ,j). From the point of
.. ·llh (XM )IIIdII171ss), Ii :::; I171n ,
I; > I171ss . (1) view of security, the usage of a single session key
.. ·lIhOM(XM)III171ssIlI;),
across a number of communications segments may
where 6m max(om, f3m), m 1, ... , M, and increase the risk from compromises. In this case,
the all parties within end-to-end communications
II denotes concatenation.

=

=

=

must have the same level of trust, something which
is difficult to .assure since the mobile unit may be
prone to physical attacks as compared to the MSS.
The use of a distinct session key for each communications segment may also be beneficial from
the point of view of data transfer between MSSs
over land-based transmission medium, such as fibre
optics. More specifically, two MSSs that exchange
a large amount of traffic may already have a secure channel established between them via a given
session key. They may then prefer to add (multiplexing) new communications instances under the
existing session key with the other traffic, rather
than to create d. separate secure channel.
In addition, this approach has an advantage in
terms of the control by the MSS over a user's MU
when the user is not active. That is, when a user
sets his or her MU to "sleep" mode in which the
MU can be "awaken" remotely by another MU,
the MSS can be assigned authority by the user as
to which other MUs are allowed to "wake-up" the
user's MU. This delegation of authority from the
MU to the MSS is a possible solution due to the
fact that any calling MU must first deal with the
controlling MSS before interacting any other MU.
This is of particular importance in cases where the
user's MU carries a database (eg. sales data) which
can be interrogated remotely by another user (eg.
a company executive).

5

Mobile Storage: Security

In this section we briefly discuss a method of storage for data in the database of a mobile unit (MU),
providing for accessibility to other MUs and fixed
hosts (FH). We focus particularly on small databases
which are located in MUs with small computing
power, such as laptop and palmtop computers. Hence,
even though such databases may offer access in the
same manner as ordinary DBMSs, we assume that
the number of users that access the database is limited and that as far as possible all CPU-consuming
operations should be performed by the calling party.
In the future, one cannot rule-out the possibility
of having larger DBMSs running on MUs with a
higher level of power. One example would be the
placement of a permanent computing unit and DBMS
in a user's vehicle (eg. car) with a larger power
supply, which is updated periodically by the user's
smaller computing unit (eg. laptop or palmtop).
Such a database should then be accessible concurrently by a number of remote users in the traditional sense.
One important requirement in all databases is
that the data stored in it should be available to
only the specified set of authorized users. In the
situation of a database within a mobile unit, the
user that carries the unit has practically complete
control over the accessibility of the data. Data in

a mobile unit should remain in an encrypted state
when not in use, since the unit may be subject
to theft and other mishaps. Due to the need of
sharing of data with other users, data in the mobile
database must also be accessible by remote users,
both when the owner of the unit is running the
database (ie. concurrent access) and when the unit
is in "sleep" mode. The limited power supply of a
mobile unit commands that only a small number of
remote users should be able to access the database.
They should also be geared towards retrieving data,
rather than requesting operations to be performed
on the portable computing unit. Furthermore, the
internal battery of the mobile unit should provide a
signal when its battery power is low, leading to the
rejection of further access by remote users whilst
maintaining the correctness and integrity of the
database.
One technique that can be used to protect data
from illegal theft and to provide secure access to
remote users is by way of encipherment. More
specifically, each data item (eg. record) Ri is enciphered under a key KR.. Several copies of this
key are created corresponding to the number of
remote users that have been registered to access
the database. For a given remote user j, the key
/(R. is stored enciphered as {I{R,} K E.,j under the
key

r E- . _
\

',J -

{ h(XJJDiJJIiJJIj),

h(XJJDdJIjJJIi),

Ii

:s: I j ,

Ii> Ij

.

(3)

where Di is the secret database key uniformly chosen by the Trusted Authority and injected into the
smartcards of users i and j at registration time.
Here Di is common to all remote users that have
registered to access the mobile database of user i.
When an authentic remote user j requests access to record Ri stored in the mobile database of
user i, the pair

is sent over the air by the mobile unit of user i.
(Here the symbol "Ox" denotes encipherment using key K). Upon receiving the pair, the tamperproof chip of the remote user j's smartcard -lodged
inside his or her mobile unit - must generate K Ei,j
and decipher {/(R,} KEi,j to obtain KRi' It then
uses KRi to decipher {R;}KR in order to recover
the plaintext Ri. After this, the chip discards KRi'
thereby making the value always inaccessible directly by mobile units other than that belonging to
user i.
To reduce traffic on the air from the mobile
unit of useri carrying the database, an alternative approach is to store the entries {/(R,}KE.,j for
each registered user j at the home site of user i.
Since this information is only decipherable by the

tamper-proof chip within the mobile units of users
i and j respectively, it can be safely replicated to
other sites depending on the location strategy used
by the network. In this case the entry can then be
delivered over the air by one of the MSSs, thereby
reducing the unnecessary power consumption at
the mobile unit of user i.

6

• The security of information within the mobile
wireless network. This includes the security of
databases holding control data used for the operations and management of the mobile wireless network.
These three sub-areas of research will be crucial if
mobile computing is to be a reality in the future.

Remarks and Conclusion
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